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RF channel usually suffer from replay or man-in-the-middle
attacks [7], whereas VLC-enabled mobile information sharing
could fundamentally combat such threats due to line-of-sight
propagation of visible light signal. Furthermore, mobile pay-
ment and ticketing systems [8] become more popular due to
their ubiquitous payment possibilities and timely access to ﬁ-
nancial assets. The existing mobile payment methods based on
NFC and RF techniques have the vulnerability under various
attacks such as eavesdropping and DDoS [9]. Future mobile
payment systems grounded on VLC would overcome these
vulnerabilities by manipulating visible light signals on screen
to conceal the information embedded in screen content [3],
[10].
As the prevalence of LED screens of wide viewing angle
and mobile devices equipped with high standard camera, the
threat of information leakage over screen-to-camera channel
however becomes in-negligible. Signiﬁcant recent research
efforts have been spent on improving the data transmission
performance of visible light communication, but few works
study securing data transmission over screen-to-camera chan-
nel. Traditional data encryption methods, such as AES or
PKI [11], either require prior knowledge on secret keys or
rely on central authority for secret key distribution. How-
ever, due to the lack of infrastructural management, such
prerequisites may not be fulﬁlled in many short range device-
to-device communication scenarios, especially for screen-to-
camera channel. Further, the physical layer-based secret key
extraction approaches over radio channel [12] are also not
applicable to visible light channel due to the non-reciprocity of
screen-to-camera channel. In this paper, we focus on securing
key distribution over visible light channel using unobtrusive
optical patterns under the presence of eavesdropping attackers.
Because the secret key distribution serves as the ﬁrst step to
secure data transmission. Recent work of SBVLC [6] is a
secure system on barcode-based visible light communication
heavily relying on screen viewing angle changes induced by
user motions. Kaleido [13] utilizes the disparities between
the screen-to-eye channel and the screen-to-camera channel
to prevent unauthorized users from videotaping leveraging
random unobtrusive optical patterns, but such random optical
patterns also prevent the regular data transmission over the
screen-to-camera channel.
To ensure the regular data transmission over visible light
channel while maintaining the data conﬁdentiality, a new
information security system is needed to cope with adversarial
eavesdropping of the secret information over screen-to-camera
channel. Kim et. al. [14] utilizes the color shift on a twisted
nematic LCD screen to present two independent views con-
currently when watching from two different viewing angles.
2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)
Abstract—Given the widely adoption of screen and camera 
in many electronic devices, the visible light communication 
(VLC) over screen-to-camera channel emerges as a novel short 
range communication technique in recent years. Active research 
explores various ways to convey messages over screen-camera 
channel, such as barcode and unobtrusive optical pattern. How-
ever, with the prevalence of LED screens of wide viewing angles 
and mobile devices equipped with high standard cameras, the 
threat of information leakage over screen-to-camera channel 
becomes in-negligible. Few studies have discussed how to en-
sure the security of data transmission over screen-to-camera 
channel. In this paper, we propose a secret key distribution 
system leveraging the unique color shift property over visible 
light channel. To facilitate such design, we develop a practical 
secret key matching based method to map the secret key into 
gridded optical patterns on screen, which can only be correctly 
recognized by the legitimate user through an accessible region 
and allow regular data stream transmission through valid grids. 
The proposed system is prototyped with off-the-shelf devices and 
validated under various experimental scenarios. The results show 
that our system can achieve high bit-decoding accuracy for the 
legitimate users while maintaining comparable data throughput 
as regular unobtrusive VLC systems with very low recovery 
accuracy of the encrypted data for the attackers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the ever-growing crowded radio environments, 
visible light communication (VLC), especially over screen-
camera channel [1]–[4], emerges as a promising way for short 
range communication in recent years. Active research explores 
various ways to convey messages over screen-camera channel. 
Particularly, it falls into two main categories, barcode (i.e., 
machine-readable optical labels visible to human eyes) and 
unobtrusive optical pattern (i.e., invisible optical patterns due 
to low luminance sensitivity or temporal ﬂick-fusion property 
of human eyes). Unlike the broadcast nature of radio commu-
nication, the highly directional propagation property renders 
visible light communication with much less interference from 
multiple concurrent data transmissions. Compared with NFC 
and other RF-based short range communication technologies, 
which need additional hardware support to secure the short 
range communication, VLC can be deployed in more practical 
environments given the widely adoption of screen and camera 
in many electronic devices. We envision the emerging VLC 
over the screen-to-camera channel will become a more com-
petitive form for short range communication, and beneﬁt many 
security-sensitive mobile applications. For example, there is 
an increasing need on mobile private information sharing [5],
[6], such as exchanging business cards and documents, in 
social places and business meetings. NFC and short range
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Inspired by the above observation, we conduct close exami-
nation on the color shift property on screens. Our empirical
studies reveal consistent color shift patterns on the captured
screen contents when varying the viewing angles of camera.
Speciﬁcally, the luminance and color intensity values of the
captured screen contents appear differently when the camera
is situated at different relative positions from the screen. Such
ﬁndings motivate us to design customized optical patterns
on screens that can only be correctly decoded by the users
at certain viewing angles. The conﬁdential data stream will
be encoded with the secret key mapped from such optical
patterns, and thereby securely transmitted over the visible light
channel. Meanwhile, the optical pattern is hard to be inferred
by the attackers from different viewing angles.
Based on the above useful ﬁndings, we design a secret
key distribution system leveraging the unique color shift
property over visible light channel. We target at delineating
a legitimate user access region that ensures the secret key
could be successfully decoded and received by the legitimate
user. We refer the surround area where the user resides as the
legitimate user access region. Whereas none or only partial
secret information could be recovered by unauthorized users
outside of this region. If an unauthorized user enters the
legitimate user access region, he will have an increased chance
to be exposed as an attacker to the legitimate user, hence
defeating his advertorial intent. To facilitate such a design,
we develop a practical secret key matching based algorithm
to map the secret key into gridded optical patterns on the
screen. The proposed method allows the secret key to be
recognized correctly by the legitimate user and enables regular
data stream transmission through valid grids. The throughput
of our proposed system is comparable to the regular VLC
systems, indicating low overhead is introduced by the secu-
rity mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, we make the following major
contributions in this project:
- Revealing the important fact that the changing viewing angles
with respect to the screen would result in color shift on the
captured screen contents. This useful phenomenon enables the
design of the legitimate user access region.
- Proposing to secret key distribution over visible light channel
leveraging the unique color shift property under the presence
of eavesdropping attackers.
- Developing a practical secret key matching based algorithm
to secure data transmission through encoding the color shift
patterns on screen.
- Implementing the prototype of the proposed secret key
distribution system and validating its performance with real
experimental results, which conﬁrms the effectiveness and
efﬁciency of the proposed system.
II. RELATED WORK
Visible light communication (VLC), as a subset of optical
wireless communication, is an emerging short range data trans-
mission technology that works on the visible light spectrum.
The VLC technologies mainly fall into two categories, screen-
to-camera-based [1]–[3] and ﬂuorescent-based [15], [16] ac-
cording to what type of transceiver is adopted. Speciﬁcally,
screen-to-camera-based VLC transmits the data that is em-
bedded as a special color pattern in the screen contents, while
any camera that is able to capture the screen content extracts
the embedded data; the ﬂuorescent-based VLC uses ordinary
ﬂuorescent lamps or standard off-the-shelf visible light LED
luminaries to transmit the data stream, which is modulated in
the form of light pulses and correspondingly demodulated by
the receiving photodiode.
Many studies have been proposed to prevent unauthorized
users to access the ﬂuorescent-based VLC [17], [18], but
the security for short range screen-to-camera VLC has not
been systematically studied. It is difﬁcult to add security
features to the screen-to-camera VLC channel due to its visual
nature. Speciﬁcally, the screen contents are subject to all
receivers including unauthorized users when they are displayed
on the screen. Recently, Zhang et. al. [6] propose a secure
system (SBVLC) for barcode-based VLC channel between
smartphones. It provides a physical security enhancement
mechanism leveraging screen viewing angle changes induced
by user motions to ensure secure information exchange. How-
ever, this study only supports barcode as the information
carrier over screen-to-camera channel and heavily relies on
human involvement. To secure short-range communication, the
near ﬁeld communication (NFC) technique has enabled pop-
ular mobile applications [7], [19] over secure communication
channel such as contact-less payments, mobile advertisements,
and device pairing, etc. However, NFC requires additional
hardware that is only available on a few smartphone platforms
on the market, and is also vulnerable to eavesdropping and
jamming attacks [8], [20].
Active studies have been driven by the color shift property
[21], [22] to display different contents to the users at different
viewing angles. Harrison et. al. [23] make the screen content
invisible when viewed straight-on, but visible at oblique an-
gles. Kim et. al. [14] propose a software solution which allows
the screen to present two independent views concurrently on
twisted nematic LCD screens. The above studies built upon the
color shift property only serve for speciﬁc viewing pattern on
screen, but they did not consider the conﬁdential information
transmission on the screen under the presence of adversaries.
Kaleido [13] utilizes the disparities between the screen-to-eye
channel and the screen–to-camera channel to prevent unautho-
rized users from videotaping a video played on a screen by re-
encoding the original video frames. However, Kaleido prevents
the data communication over screen-to-camera channel due to
the randomly adopted optical patterns on screen. Unlike the
existing studies, our proposed approach introduces a secret
key distribution mechanism over the screen-to-camera VLC
channel leveraging the color shift property on LCD screen.
The proposed secure communication system is integrated with
our previous visible light communication system, Uber-in-
Light [4], for communication performance study.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
A. System Design
1) Background of Visible Light Communication: Visible
light communication (VLC) over screen-to-camera channel
has the data encoded as speciﬁc optical patterns displayed
on screen, which can be captured by any camera-equipped
devices thereafter for data decoding. The encoded information
is usually represented as some speciﬁc optical patterns on
screen [2], [3], [6]. In this paper, we focus on utilizing the
luminance value L, an optical pattern contributed by three
color channels (i.e., Red, Green, and Blue) as the secret key,
to encode the data stream over the screen-to-camera channel.
The data is encoded in such a way that the normal viewing
experience of users such as displaying a picture or watching a
video is not disturbed. Given the viewing angle in horizontal
and vertical directions (Θ, Φ) and the distance (D) with respect
to the screen, the expected luminance LˆC (where C indicates
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Fig. 1. Workﬂow of the proposed VLC security system.
a particular color C ∈ {R,G,B}) on camera is derived based
on the visible light channel model:
LˆC(Θ,Φ, D) = H(Θ,Φ, D) ∗ LC +N (1)
where LC is the luminance value of the color C displayed on
screen, H(Θ,Φ, D) represents the channel response function
on the screen-to-camera channel, and N represents external
light interferences. Note that ∗ indicates the operator that
applies the channel response to LC , and H(Θ,Φ, D) will be
obtained through our empirical study (i.e., color shift curves).
2) Problem Formulation: Our objective is to secure the vis-
ible light communication over screen-to-camera channel under
the presence of eavesdropping adversaries. Instead of relying
on traditional data encryption methods, the color shift property
of screen-to-camera channel is utilized to prevent the unautho-
rized users from decoding the transmitted data successfully.
In particular, the expected luminance pattern should be only
correctly decoded by the legitimate user from certain viewing
angles. Whereas the unauthorized users situated outside of the
region of the legitimate user’s viewing angles cannot decode
the pattern correctly. Assuming the luminance values observed
by an attacker K and the legitimate user U are LˆCK(Θ
′,Φ′, D′)
and LˆCU (Θ,Φ, D), respectively, the following condition should
be satisﬁed to ensure the communication security as follows:
|LˆCK(Θ′,Φ′, D′)− LˆCU (Θ,Φ, D)| ≥ ΔL, ∀Θ′,Φ′, d′
s.t., [Θ,Φ] [Θ′,Φ′]T ≥ Δ, D′ ≥ λ,
Θ ∈ [θb, θu] ,Φ ∈ [φb, φu] , D ∈ [db, du] .
(2)
where ΔL is the predeﬁned luminance threshold,
[Θ,Φ] [Θ′,Φ′]T (with T represents vector transpose)
represents the inner product of the 2D viewing angle vector
between the attacker and the legitimate user, Δ and λ are
the thresholds indicating the restriction on viewing angle and
distance of the attacker with respect to the screen,
[
θb, θu
]
,[
φb, φu
]
and
[
db, du
]
together regulate the region where the
legitimate user locates. In practice, if the screen is partitioned
into multiple grids, the proposed system should ensure as
many grids as possible to satisfy the above condition.
B. Design Challenges
To realize such a VLC security system based on the
problem formulation, we need to address the following three
main challenges:
- Easy Deployment. Due to the increasing popularity of the
VLC system to support a broad range of applications, easy
deployment is highly desirable. The designed system should
target to use off-the-shelf devices.
- Reliable Key Mapping. We plan to design luminance patterns
on the screen, which could only be correctly decoded by the
legitimate user at a speciﬁc viewing angle/region. Thus, the
proposed system should ensure the uniqueness of the secret
key for the legitimate user, while the attacker will most likely
derive the incorrect secret key from his viewing angle.
- Efﬁcient Key Extraction for Various Screen Contents. Given
a speciﬁc viewing angle, the camera-equipped user should be
able to fast and accurately identify the encoded luminance
pattern by eliminating both the geometric distortion due to
the perspective effects and external luminance interference. -
Maintaining System Throughput. The designed VLC secret key
distribution system should maintain the throughput of visible
light communication and does not disturb the normal viewing
experience of the legitimate user.
C. System Workﬂow
The basic idea of the proposed system is to map the secret
key to a unique optical pattern, which can only be correctly
decoded by the legitimate user situated at an expected viewing
angle. According to the color shift property, the change of the
viewing angle towards the screen results in different captured
optical patterns at the camera. The details of the color shift
property are presented in Section IV. Such a unique optical
pattern then acts as a gridded mask to encode the transmitting
data stream embedded in the screen contents, and it also can
be decoded at the receiver for data stream extraction. Since we
focus on the secret key distribution over visible light channel,
existing VLC modulation & demodulation approaches will be
adopted here [4]. As depicted in Figure 1, the proposed system
consists of ﬁve main components: Gridded Key Mapping, Data
Modulation & Encoding, User Access Region Identiﬁcation,
Key Extraction and Data Demodulation & Decoding.
The proposed system divides the screen into smaller grids,
and each grid acts an independent visible light channel for
data transmission. The system utilizes the independent grid
channel characteristics to encode the secret key. Different grids
play different roles. For instance, some of the grids ﬁlled with
the key information are referred as invalid grids, while other
grids do not carry any key information but are used for data
transmission referred as valid grids. The usage of the grids,
including both the number and position of the invalid grids, to
carry key information is ﬂexible and could be adjusted by the
system. The valid grids also change their luminance randomly
during data transmission to confuse the attacker.
To start, our system can ﬂexibly adjust the transmission
optical pattern based on the position of the legitimate user,
instead of restricting the user have to reside at a ﬁxed position
to obtain the secret key information. To achieve this, our
strategies is to set a default luminance value at four corner
grids on the transmitter screen. Then the legitimate user
captures the screen content, and acknowledges the transmitter
about the observed luminance values at the four corner grids
through public wireless channels. Speciﬁcally, the legitimate
user can encode the observed luminance values as ﬂashlight
signals that can be captured by the camera on the transmitter,
or utilize WiFi and Bluetooth connections that are publicly
accessible in many places nowadays to send the observed
2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)
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Fig. 2. Luminance curves of vertical angle range Φ ∈ (−80◦, 80◦) with
horizontal angle ﬁxed at Θ = 0◦.
luminance values. We do not require the security of out-of-
band channels (e.g., WiFi and Bluetooth).. By matching these
values to the color shift proﬁles, the legitimate user access
region could be uniquely determined based on the relationship
between the expected luminance pattern and viewing angles.
The secret data will then be modulated to the corresponding
optical patterns on screen with respect to the legitimate user
access region.
The system has the secret key and data stream as two
inputs for Gridded Key Mapping and Data Modulation &
Video Fusion components, respectively. The secret key is ﬁrst
mapped to such an optical pattern that can only be correctly
decoded by the legitimate user based on the pre-built color
shift proﬁle for each grid on screen. The color shift proﬁle
only needs to be built once, and solely maintained at the
transmitter (i.e., screen). Then the optical pattern is mapped to
the valid grids with different number and screen positions each
time when there is a secret key to be distributed. Thus, it is
difﬁcult for an attacker to predict the expected optical pattern
used for the secret key transmission. Speciﬁcally, we develop a
secret key matching based algorithm, which utilizes each grid
independently to encode the secret key. The expected optical
pattern at receiver will be converted to a gridded mask. After
the secret key is successfully received, the data stream, as
the second input, is then modulated as unobtrusive luminance
changes against arbitrary video contents. Before being sent
to the screen-to-camera channel, the modulated data stream
is encoded with the gridded mask. Correspondingly, the data
demodulation & decoding will be performed based on the
captured screen contents and recover the original data stream.
The detailed description of each component is presented in
later sections.
D. Attack Model
In this work, we utilize the terminologies of unautho-
rized user and attacker interchangeably. The attacker has the
capability to access the screen (i.e., transmitter), but at a
different angle and distance from the legitimate user. The
attacker is equipped with the same kind of devices as the
legitimate user’s to capture the screen contents and eavesdrops
the security information embedded in the detected luminance.
The decoding algorithms for security information extraction
are public for any receiving device. The attacker makes the
efforts to avoid residing at the same viewing angle and distance
as the legitimate user. The closer the attacker gets to the
legitimate user, the higher the risk he/she will be exposed.
Thus the attacker is detected in proximity, and the system
will suspend the data transmission. Therefore the adversarial
intent can not be achieved. Furthermore, the attacker does not
access the legitimate users color shift proﬁles. In this work,
we only consider an attacker with passive behaviors such as
eavesdropping with the purpose of obtaining the secret key,
while for those active attackers who would interfere with the
environmental light conditions will end up not be able to crack
a correct key.
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Fig. 3. Luminance curves of horizontal angle range Θ ∈ (−80◦, 80◦) with
vertical angle ﬁxed at Φ = 0◦.
IV. FEASIBILITY STUDY
Color shift property over screen-to-camera channel would
result in signiﬁcant difference on the expected optical patterns
from different vertical viewing angles. Therefore, it is critical
to ensure the expected optical pattern can be correctly detected
by the legitimate user. Speciﬁcally, two requirements should
be satisﬁed: 1) the expected optical pattern captured by the
legitimate user should be known by the transmitter; 2) the
expected optical pattern captured by the legitimate user should
be unique from all available vertical viewing angles.
A. Color Shift Study
An LCD comprises of a matrix of LC (liquid crystal)
molecules between two polarizers and a uniform backlight
beneath them. Varying the voltage applied to the LC molecules
controls their direction and in turn the light intensity eventually
emitted from the screen. When the viewer looks at the screen
from different angles, the line of light transmission is also
at different angles with regard to the direction of the LC
molecules. This results in the light polarization directions
being rotated differently by the LC molecules, leading to
different light intensities emitted from the same pixel to
different angles. To study the color shift property, we carry out
a series of preliminary experiments in a typical home/ofﬁce
environment, where a number of default luminance values
(e.g., 10) ranging from 0 to 255 applied to the same screen
are detected from different viewing angles from (0◦,−80◦) to
(0◦,80◦). Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the luminance curves
along the vertical and horizontal directions respectively. The
important observations are that 1) given one default luminance
on screen, the detected luminance values are different as the
viewing angles changes, and 2) given one particular viewing
angle, the detected luminance values show different variation
trend as the default luminance value on the screen changes.
The above observations indicate that it is difﬁcult to predict
the color shift pattern at different viewing angles, unless all the
combination of default luminance values and viewing angles
are visited. For different LCD screens, the color shift patterns
are also exhibited differently, so there is no way to derive the
color shift pattern of one particular LCD screen from other
LCD screens. Further, the color shift pattern is asymmetric,
so it is also impossible to infer the expected optical pattern at
a particular viewing angle from its symmetrical viewing angle.
This phenomenon is more obvious in the vertical direction than
that in the horizontal direction.
Next, we need to locate the most appropriate range of
viewing angles that ensures the legitimate user to obtain
reliable expected optical pattern. Given the color shift pattern
along vertical direction as in Figure 2, we partition the viewing
angle Θ into two different regions as below: 1) Vertical angle
Φ ∈ (−80◦,−50◦)⋃(50◦, 80◦) and horizontal angle Θ = 0◦
: The detected luminance values are much lower than the
default luminance values set on screen, so it is not reliable
to retrieve the expected luminance values at the receiver side
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the legitimate user access region.
due to the limited luminance sensitivity on camera. We do not
prefer to adopt this region for our proposed system; 2) Vertical
angle Φ ∈ (−50◦, 50◦) and horizontal angle Θ = 0◦: The
detected luminance values do not have signiﬁcant degradation
in comparison with the default luminance values set on the
screen, so it should satisfy the requirements for expected
luminance value detection. More importantly, the detected
luminance value does not keep constant in this viewing angle
region, so it would result in different luminance values to be
detected from any two different viewing angles. For the color
shift pattern along horizontal direction as shown in Figure 3, 1)
Horizontal angle Θ ∈ (−80◦,−50◦)⋃(50◦, 80◦) and vertical
angle Φ = 0◦: the detection luminance values also have sharp
degradation as that in vertical direction; 2) Horizontal angle
Θ ∈ (−50◦, 50◦) and vertical angle Φ = 0◦: the detected
luminance curves are so smooth that may result in similar
detected luminance values at two far-away viewing angles, so
it is not practical to rely the color shift properties solely along
horizontal direction to secure the VLC channel.
In general, the color shift properties on screen-to-camera
channel can be summarized as follows: 1) ﬁxed RGB com-
bination color follows stable detected luminance curve with
viewing angle change; 2) the vertical angle impact on the
detected luminance is larger than horizontal angle impact; and
3) each luminance curve is unpredictable and unique. It cannot
be obtained with theoretical calculation.
B. Legitimate User Access Region
Before introducing the proposed system, we ﬁrst need
to deﬁne the legitimate user access region, which is critical
to perform secret key distribution utilizing the color shift
proﬁles. As introduced in Section IV-A, the luminance values
on each individual color channel represent a unique pattern at
a speciﬁc vertical viewing angle, correspondingly the overall
luminance value contributed from three color channels also
show distinct patterns from different vertical viewing angles.
It enables the legitimate user to map the secret key to an
expected luminance pattern dedicated to a small vertical view-
ing angle region, which is different from that of attacker’s.
In the meanwhile, since the detected luminance in horizontal
direction changes much smoother than that in the vertical
direction, the horizontal viewing angle has more ﬂexibility on
the region that allows legitimate user to access. Speciﬁcally,
the legitimate user access region is deﬁned as a pyramid
region with the width in horizontal direction (i.e., X axis)
larger than that in vertical direction (i.e., Y axis) as shown
in Figure 4. Within this region, the legitimate user can receive
the expected luminance pattern from the screen. Outside this
region, the users obtain different luminance patterns, and
thereby miss or only access partial secret key embedded in the
expected luminance values. Considering the symmetric color
shift property in the horizontal direction of LCD screen, the
legitimate user access region should be as much as close to
the horizontal angle 0◦.
V. ALGORITHM
The goal of the algorithm design is to map a secret key
to a unique luminance pattern on screen, and such luminance
pattern can only be correctly decoded within the legitimate
user access region.
A. Color Shift Proﬁling
In order to perform practical secret key distribution, we
ﬁrst need to build the color shift proﬁles, which are the
collections of the detected luminance values from different
viewing angles. We have the screen divided into multiple grids
to carry out concurrent data transmissions, where the secret
key is transmitted in the manner of valid grids, and the data
transmission is performed through invalid grids. According to
color shift study, the camera will obtain different expected
luminance patterns on each grid even if the whole screen
has one single luminance value from different viewing angles.
Therefore, the color shift proﬁles should include 1) (luminance
setting, angle) on the screen, and 2) (expected luminance
value, angle) can be captured by the camera.
In our empirical study, we choose 10 luminance values
ranging from 0 to 255 with the interval 30 as the benchmark lu-
minance, and each of these luminance values will be applied to
m×n grids on the screen. For the convenience of processing,
we utilize a chessboard-like pattern to represent the grids on
screen. Next, the expected luminance values on these grids will
be collected by the camera from 17 different viewing angles
ranging from −80◦ to +80◦ in vertical direction. At each
viewing angle, m×n expected luminance values are recorded.
Figure 5 displays an example of color shift proﬁles from
different viewing angles. It conﬁrms that different grids have
different expected luminance values with the same benchmark
luminance. Considering all the benchmark luminance values
and viewing angles, 17 × 10 × m × n expected luminance
values will be collected to build the color shift proﬁles in
total. To facilitate practical system design, the transmitter (i.e.,
screen) only needs to build the color shift proﬁle once, which
is unknown to the users.
B. User Access Region Identiﬁcation
Before the secret key transmission, in order to avoid the
ambient light interference, the transmitting screen at ﬁrst is set
to pure black color before performing key extraction, so that
the receiver could collect current ambient light signals N pro-
jected on the screen in Equation 2. Such interference will be
deducted from the detected luminance values in the rest of the
frames. Next, the transmitter needs to recognize the legitimate
user access region, which is critical to establish the secure
visible light channel between a pair of transceivers. Without
loss of generality, the transmitter sends a default luminance
value at four corner grids on screen, and the legitimate user
acknowledges the corresponding observed luminance values
through public wireless channels (i.e., encoded as ﬂashlight
signals to be captured by the camera on transmitter, or sent
over existing WiFi or Bluetooth links). Next, the transmitter is
able to identify the legitimate user access region based on the
relationship between expected luminance pattern and viewing
angles in color shift proﬁles. Therefore, the secure visible light
channel is established with the common knowledge on the
legitimate user access region between transmitter and receiver.
Since the attackers have no idea about the color proﬁles that
are stored on transmitter, they still can not determine the le-
gitimate user access region even the acknowledged luminance
values from receiver are intercepted.
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(a) Default luminance 30 at
the viewing angle (Θ,Φ) =
(0◦, 10◦).
(b) Default luminance 120 at
the viewing angle (Θ,Φ) =
(0◦, 20◦).
Fig. 5. Illustration of color shift proﬁling for different viewing angles.
C. Key Matching based Method
Basic Idea. Key matching based method aims to encode
the secret key to such a luminance pattern on screen that
could only be successfully decoded by the receivers within
the legitimate user access region. To achieve this, it is critical
to select appropriate valid grids on the screen, and assign
luminance values from the color shift proﬁles to these valid
grids. Therefore, it could involve as many as possible valid
grids rendering different expected luminance values between
legitimate user and attacker in Equation 2.
Key Mapping. In this step, the transmitter maps out such
a luminance pattern on screen that could result in the expected
luminance value Le on the valid grids for the legitimate
user. We ﬁrst choose a certain number of valid grids on
the screen, and the number of valid grids is deﬁned as the
key length K. It is essential to have the valid grids widely
distributed over the screen. According to the color shift study
in Section IV, the expected luminance value is sensitive to
the changes on the legitimate user access region, so the wide
distribution of valid grids could minimize the opportunities of
the attacker to obtain the correct expected luminance values.
Speciﬁcally, we traverse the luminance proﬁle of each grid on
the chessboard, and seek for a subset of valid grids Gv that
could produce the expected luminance value at the legitimate
user access region. Next, K valid grids of Gv will be chosen
and ﬁlled with appropriate luminance values Lˆ to ensure that
the detected luminance values at the legitimate user access
region match the expected luminance values Le. Since each
grid on the screen has an independent color shift proﬁle, Lˆ
will be obtained through exhaustive search in the color shift
proﬁles for different valid grids.
By now we could retain the expected luminance value for
the valid grids within the legitimate user access region. There
may be multiple Lˆ values fulﬁlling the above requirement,
but some Lˆ may make the attacker also obtain the expected
luminance value for the valid grids outside the legitimate user
access region. Improper Lˆ should be eliminated based on the
required condition in Equation 2. Therefore, the valid grids
assigned by the transmitter can only be correctly identiﬁed
by legitimate user. Furthermore, since the expected luminance
value is publicly available for any user, to further enhance the
security and confuse the attacker, some of the remaining grids
(i.e., invalid grids) will be ﬁlled in with the luminance values
that would also match the expected luminance value outside
of the legitimate user access region.
Key Extraction. Next, the legitimate user will identify
the expected luminance pattern, and extract all the valid
grids. We assume L˜ is the luminance value read out from
the captured screen content for a speciﬁc valid grid [m,n].
According to the visible light channel model in Equation 1,
L˜ may not exactly match the expected luminance value at
the legitimate user access region due to the ambient light
interference. The difference between L˜ and Le is represented
as δ = |Le [m,n]− L˜ [m,n] |.
To tolerate the error introduced by the interference, we
validate each grid through the following hypothesis test with
a predeﬁned threshold ΔL:
I =
{
0 δ  ΔL
1 δ > ΔL
(3)
where I indicates whether the grid matches the expected lumi-
nance value. If the difference between the detected luminance
value and expected luminance value is less than ΔT , the
grid will be marked as a valid grid; otherwise it will be
marked as an invalid grid, which will participate in the data
communication.
Security Analysis. The key matching based method re-
sults in a set of discrete valid grids on the screen, and
the luminance value on each valid grid is chosen from the
color shift proﬁles with respect to a particular legitimate
user access region. Experimental results (in Section VII-C)
show that it is highly impossible for the attacker to obtain
all valid grids without entering the legitimate user access
region. Furthermore, the invalid grids are also designed to
produce the expected luminance value at some viewing angles
outside of the legitimate user access region. If the attacker
happens to reside at these viewing angles, some invalid grids
will incorrectly be detected as valid grids. Since the number
of valid grids, which represents the key length, is randomly
chosen at the transmitter, the attacker may obtain different
numbers of valid grids outside the legitimate user access
region.
D. Data Transmission
After the secret key is successfully distributed to the legit-
imate user, we adopt the existing work [4] to perform the data
transmission. The data stream embedded in the video frames
is transmitted in an unobtrusive luminance manner, which will
not disturb the user’s viewing experience on watching a video.
Speciﬁcally, the data stream is multiplexed as complementary
color intensity changes over Red, Green, and Blue (RGB)
channels onto the video frames. As shown in the system
workﬂow in Figure 1, we next need to perform the data
encoding via the secret key in the key matching algorithm
after the data modulation. The real data stream embedded
in the video frames are only appeared on invalid grids for
transmission, while the valid grids only create random data
streams to confuse the attackers. So the data throughput is
proportional to the number of invalid grids.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We implement the proposed secret key distribution system
over visible light channel with C++ and OpenCV libraries.
OpenCV libraries provide well-developed image processing
and feature detection functions. The transmitter and receiver
are deployed on an LCD monitor and smartphone respectively.
In particular, we choose Dell 24′′ LCD monitor with the
refresh rate of 60fps as the transmitter because for the
transmitter to encode data, its screen needs to be able to
display at least 60 frames per second and exhibits color shift at
various viewing angles. There are two inputs, the data stream
and a binary secret key, for the transmitter to processing. The
transmitter maps the secret key to a gridded optical pattern,
modulates the data stream onto the video frames, and displays
the multiplexed video stream on screen. We utilize the built-in
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(a) Chessboard Display. (b) Video Display.
Fig. 6. Experimental setup.
function cvRectangle in OpenCV to create a communication
layer, which is used to generate chessboard grids and assign
different luminance values on the grids based on the secret
key to be distributed.
For the receiver, we choose iPhone 6, which has the built-
in camera with the refresh rate of 240fps, so that it can
be able to capture the data stream embedded in the video
stream at 60fps, To implement the receiver, we use the module
AVCapture in the iOS AVFoundation framework to record
videos, and then decode the secret key from the recorded video
with the build-in OpenCV functions. The receiver captures the
screen contents on screen, detects the gridded optical pattern
and calculate average luminance on each grid. Speciﬁcally,
we utilize cvFindChessboardCorners function to identify the
chessboard from the captured screen content, and extract the
luminance value of each grid. To provide reliable detection
results, we enable the built-in light sensor in smartphone to
adjust the ISO value in camera, so that it could adapt to the
darkness of external environment.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed secret key distribution system. We examine the detected
luminance of the grids on the screen from different viewing
angels, and evaluate the grid identiﬁcation accuracy and bits
decoding accuracy over the screen-to-camera VLC channel.
We ﬁrst introduce our experimental methodology and metrics,
and then discuss the evaluation results.
A. Methodology
The proposed secret key distribution system is evaluated
with a TN LCD screen (i.e, 24′′ Dell monitor with 1600×900
resolution and 60Hz refresh rate as the transmitter) and two
smartphones (i.e., we use iPhone 6 to act as both legitimate
users and attacker) in typical home/ofﬁce environments, where
the external light interferences keep constant. Note that the
proposed system is suitable for generic monitors and off-the-
shelf mobile devices without specialized hardware require-
ments. The screen is held by a monitor arm that can adjust
the orientation of the screen as shown in Figure 6 (a). The
exposure time and ISO of camera are ﬁxed at 1/90sec and 100,
respectively, and the white balance on the camera is locked.
To evaluate the key distribution effectiveness and security
of the proposed system, we place one iPhone 6 within the
legitimate user access region that could be 65cm, 80cm and
100cm from the screen as shown in Figure 6 (a), and we also
have another iPhone 6 reside outside the legitimate user access
region with the same distance. The reason why we use the
same type of devices acting as both the legitimate user and
attacker is to ensure equivalent capabilities when extracting
the secret key from the transmitter. if other types of devices
are employed, the attacker will experience low possibility
to successfully to obtain the correct secret key. The color
shift proﬁling process has the screen automatically display the
default luminance values, while the camera captures the color
shift proﬁles when the viewing angle is manually adjusted
to cover all the viewing angles. The whole process usually
lasts for less than 1 hour. The expected luminance patterns,
which involve 10 different luminance values ranging from 0
to 255, with respect to different legitimate user access regions
are designed according to the rules deﬁned in the proposed
key matching algorithm. We vary the viewing angles of the
camera by changing the orientation of the screen to capture
the luminance pattern on the screen, and both legitimate
user and attacker will perform key extraction individually.
In this experiment, the viewing angle varies from −80◦ to
80◦ both vertically and horizontally, which is controlled by a
digital protractor, and we examine security performance from
different viewing angles. In particular, we generate 5 different
chessboards of the size 5×5, 6×6, 7×7, 8×8 and 9×9 for
performance evaluation. Only the results for the size 5×5
and 9×9 are given in this paper, since the performance of
other sizes falls between that of 5×5 and 9×9. Based on our
empirical study, in general the expected luminance detection
threshold is ﬁxed at ±5 unless explicitly mentioned.
To evaluate the encrypted data transmission accuracy and
throughput, we develop the proposed secure communication
system based on our visible light channel communication
system, Uber-in-Light [4], which has achieved comparable
data rate with other existing VLC communication systems
(Highlight [3] and Inframe [2]). We evaluate the communi-
cation performance of the proposed secure communication
system based on Uber-in-light [4]. The data streams are
embedded into a drama video with 30fps lasting for 1min
as shown in Figure 6 (b), and only the invalid grids allow
real data transmission. Both legitimate user and attacker are
equipped with the cameras to capture the video frames for
data decoding. The data transmission accuracy is evaluated
with respect to speciﬁc legitimate user access regions, and the
throughput is inspected under the impact of chessboard size.
B. Metrics
To evaluate the system performance comprehensively, we
deﬁne the following two metrics, Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy
and Bit Decoding Accuracy, as follows:
1) Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy: The system independently
detects the luminance value on each grid when distributing
the secret key, and identify the grids who render the expected
luminance values. The grid identiﬁcation accuracy Pgrid is de-
ﬁned as the percentage of correctly identiﬁed grids Gr over the
grids that are supposed to produce expected luminance value in
legitimate user access region Gs, i.e., Pgrid = (Gr
⋂
Gs)/Gs.
2) Bit Decoding Accuracy.: The bit decoding accuracy is
deﬁned as the percentage of correctly received bits over all
data bits transmitted over the screen-to-camera channel as,
Pbits = (br
⋂
bs)/bs, where br is the bits correctly decoded
at the receiver, and bs is all the transmitted bits.
C. Evaluation Results
1) Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy: Impact of Viewing An-
gles. We ﬁrst study the grid identiﬁcation accuracy when vary-
ing the viewing angles in vertical direction Φ but ﬁxed at Θ =
0◦ in horizontal direction. Both the 5×5 and 9×9 chessboard
are deployed in the experiments. Figure 7 depicts the average
grid identiﬁcation accuracy for both the legitimate user and
attacker given 4 different legitimate user access regions (i.e.,
(Θ,Φ) = (0◦,±20◦) and (0◦,±40◦)). For both chessboard
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(a) (Θ,Φ) = (0◦, 20◦). (b) (Θ,Φ) = (0◦,−20◦).
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(c) (Θ,Φ) = (0◦, 40◦). (d) (Θ,Φ) = (0◦,−40◦).
Fig. 7. Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy in the vertical direction when
the legitimate user is positioned at four different vertical angles,
(0◦, 20◦), (0◦,−20◦), (0◦, 40◦), and (0◦,−40◦) on the 5×5 and 9×9
chessboards; and the attacker accesses the screen from outside the legitimate
user access region.
sizes, the legitimate user always has 100% grid identiﬁcation
accuracy while the attacker outside legitimate user access
region maintains consistent low accuracy. It implies that the
attacker can barely recover most of the valid grids without
entering the legitimate user access region. This is because
the expected luminance values vary so sharply as shown in
Figure 2 that even small changes on the viewing angle would
induce signiﬁcant changes on the expected luminance outside
legitimate user access region. Given that the valid grids are
scatteredly distributed, it is easy to infer that the key matching
based method is not sensitive to the chessboard size, which
is conﬁrmed by the results shown in Figure 7. We focus on
5×5 chessboard in the rest of the performance evaluation due
to the less impact on chessboard size.
Next we discuss the grid identiﬁcation accuracy when the
viewing angle varies in the horizontal direction but ﬁxed in
vertical direction. As shown in Figure 8 (a)-(c), given any
speciﬁc angle in vertical direction (i.e., Φ = ±20◦ or 40◦), it
always retains the grid identiﬁcation accuracy for legitimate
user as high as over 80% when the legitimate user access
region is restricted within Θ = [−10◦, 10◦] in horizontal
direction, while the attacker has low accuracy (i.e., less than
20%) outside of this region. Figure 8 (d) has relatively higher
grid identiﬁcation accuracy for the attacker (i.e., 60%), since
the expected luminance at Φ = −40◦ does not change as sharp
as those at other vertical angles along the horizontal direction.
Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy Study of different key
lengths. We study the impact of key length to our key
matching based approach. Speciﬁcally, the grid identiﬁcation
accuracy is examined as the difference of viewing angles
between legitimate user and attacker changes. Figure 9 shows
that the grid identiﬁcation accuracy for the attacker always
maintains as low as 20% for both short and long key lengths
(i.e., ≤ 4 and ≥ 5). It indicates that our key matching method
is robust to defend against the attacks with different key
lengths.
Impact of Distance, Threshold and Wide-Range User
Access Region. In Figure 10 (a), we study the impact of
geometric distance between transmitter and receiver to the grid
identiﬁcation accuracy. As the distance increases, the mutual
interference on the adjacent grids become innegligible for key
matching based method. It may result in similar expected
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Fig. 8. Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy of different legitimate user access region
in the horizontal direction.
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Fig. 9. Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy of the attacker across multiple chess-
boards under different key lengths.
luminance for the same valid grid at different viewing angles.
So the overall performance with short distance is slightly better
than that with long distance.
Figure 10 (b) presents the impact of different thresholds
(i.e., ±5 and ±10) for the expected luminance detection. As
the threshold increases, the grid identiﬁcation accuracy for
the attacker increases accordingly. The expected luminance
values of some grids may not have much difference between
the legitimate user and attacker. If these grids happen to be
valid grids, it is also possible to correctly determine them as
valid grids with a larger threshold by the attacker. Further, the
threshold should not be too small in avoid of the impact of
ambient light interference.
Previous results study the security performance for narrow-
range legitimate user access region, which corresponds to one
speciﬁc viewing angle. However, with careful design on the
expected luminance pattern, the proposed system could also
serve for wide-range legitimate user access region. As shown
in Figure 10 (c) and (d), we ﬁnd that the grid identiﬁcation
accuracy still maintains over 90% when the viewing angle
differences increases to 10◦ and 20◦ in the vertical and
horizontal directions, respectively. The above results indicate
the possibility of introducing wide-range legitimate user access
region to our proposed system for secret key distribution.
Such wide-range legitimate user access region provides the
ﬂexibility for mobile users, but it also increases the risk that
the attacker may enter the legitimate user access region.
2) System Bit Decoding Accuracy: We discuss the bit
decoding accuracy for the data stream encrypted with secret
key generated by the key matching based method. As shown
in the Figure 11 (a), we observe that the bit decoding accuracy
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Fig. 10. Grid Identiﬁcation Accuracy with different transmission distances,
thresholds and wide-range legitimate user access region.
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Fig. 11. Performance of Data Transmission.
of legitimate user keeps as high as over 95% at the viewing
angle 20◦ and 30◦, while the attacker can only achieve around
50% accuracy outside legitimate user access region, which is
equivalent to random guess.
3) System Throughput: Finally, the throughput perfor-
mance of the proposed VLC security system is studied.
Figure 11 (b) presents the throughput for key matching based
method under different number of grids on chessboard. We
ﬁnd that the throughput keep increasing while the number of
grid on the chessboard goes larger. Particularly, it achieves
over 300bps when deploying 9×9 chessboard. The results also
conﬁrms that the proposed security mechanisms introduces
little throughput overhead comparing with Uber-in-Light [4].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a secret key distribution sys-
tem leveraging the color shift property over screen-to-camera
channel. Inspired by such observation that the visible infor-
mation displayed on screen would result in different optical
patterns from different viewing angles, we develop the secret
key matching based algorithm to map the secret key into a
unique gridded optical pattern that is only accessible from a
speciﬁc region. In particular, the proposed method encodes
the secret key to an expected luminance pattern on each grid
independently, so it provides high ﬂexibility of the legitimate
user access region with different key lengths, and controls
the system throughput easily. We prototype the proposed
system with off-the-shelf devices and evaluate it under various
experimental scenarios. The experimental results conﬁrm the
effectiveness of our system in terms of high bit-decoding
accuracy for the legitimate users and very low key recovery
accuracy for the attackers.
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